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WHAT COMMON LAW AND COMMON SENSE TEACH US
ABOUT CORPORATE CYBERSECURITY
Stephanie Balitzer*
Network intrusions and the consequential losses of data and confidentiality plague
corporations. With each of these breaches, corporations suffer financial and reputa-
tional losses, leaving them scrambling to defend their networks and curb future
hacks. Moreover, because their attackers strike from around the globe, are fueled by
many motivations, and have ample tools at their disposal, hacks can be almost
impossible to predict. The imperfect legal framework in this area only exacerbates
this climate of uncertainty. Although active defense strategies like “hacking back”
currently exceed the scope of corporate legal rights, many commentators have advo-
cated for the legalization of these practices in the realm of corporate cybersecurity.
This Note argues that active defense strategies do not present a viable option for
corporations, as they contravene well-developed common law property principles
and would generate several negative legal and practical consequences. Instead of
deregulating the sphere of corporate cybersecurity to permit corporations to hack
back, the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) should utilize its
expertise and functionality as an inter-agency data repository to formulate regula-
tions in conjunction with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Such
regulations, which would clarify the scope of permissible corporate cyberdefense
strategies, would create a viable and sustainable framework for corporations to
follow.
INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity has emerged as one of the most challenging
problems of the modern era. Corporations face immense obstacles
navigating technical and legal frameworks to ensure the confidenti-
ality and integrity of their data and their consumers’ personal
information.1 Unfortunately, this corporate cybersecurity problem
is growing. In response, many commentators argue that the law
should authorize corporations to engage in active defense and,
more specifically, hacking back. This solution is not tenable, how-
ever, because it effectively sanctions vigilantism and presents the
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, 2016; B.A., Tufts University,
2010. I would like to thank my fellow editors of the Michigan Journal of Law Reform,
Professor Julian Mortenson, and my friends Joseph Celentino and Benjamin Reese for their
invaluable feedback.
1. See, e.g., Michael Riley, Ben Elgin & Carol Matlack, Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen
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same negative legal and practical consequences as hacking itself.
Instead, the newly created Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration
Center (CTIIC) should collaborate with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) to pass regulations that have the capacity
to evolve with the changing Internet environment.
This Note examines the challenges of corporate cyberdefense
and suggests an approach to mitigate them. Part I outlines the back-
ground of the corporate cyberdefense quandary and various
cyberdefense strategies. Part II explores the current landscape of
cybersecurity law in the United States and the regulatory infrastruc-
ture that governs cybercrimes. Part II also surveys case law that
illustrates the legal loopholes and ambiguities corporations face
when implementing cybersecurity measures. Finally, Part III argues
that the proposed active defense model fails to comport with practi-
cal concerns and established legal principles. This Note’s
comparative analysis of common law ‘defense of property’ princi-
ples and corporate cyberdefense provides a framework from which
the Federal Communications Commission,2 in conjunction with the
Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, should promulgate
sensible and legally-sound corporate cyberdefense guidelines.
I. A BACKGROUND ON CORPORATE CYBERDEFENSE
The digital era has rendered corporations extremely vulnerable
to cyberattacks. The term “cyberattack” is used to describe “deliber-
ate actions” to “alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy
computer systems or networks” or the information on those net-
works,3 or to sabotage or steal corporate assets.4 As a result of
successful cyberattacks, corporations often suffer significant losses.5
Cyberattacks threaten corporate trade secrets, intellectual property,
infrastructure, personally identifiable information (PII), and the in-
tegrity of other sensitive information. This Part will detail the
2. The Federal Communications Commission is authorized to regulate “interstate and
international communications by . . . wire” and is “the United States’ primary authority for
communications law, regulation, and technological innovation.” FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/general/what-we-do (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
3. Zach West, Young Fella, If You’re Looking for Trouble I’ll Accommodate You: Deputizing
Private Companies for the Use of Hackback, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 119, 122 (2012) (citing NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS RE-
GARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 1 (William A. Owens et al.
eds., 2009).
4. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The Developing U.S. Legal Standard for Cybersecurity, 4
SEDONA CONF. J. 109, 109 (2003).
5. See Computer Intrusions, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/com-
puter-intrusions (last visited Apr. 8, 2016); see also West, supra note 3, at 128–29.
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quantitative and qualitative costs that arise from cyberattacks. It will
also offer an example of an intrusion upon a corporate retailer’s
network that demonstrates the severity of such costs. It will con-
clude by illustrating how breaches occur and the possible actions
corporations may take to defend against such breaches.
A. An Examination of the Costs of the Breach Problem
1. Quantitative Costs
Breaches of corporate networks create significant quantitative
losses. According to an IBM study, each data breach costs a compro-
mised company an average of $6.5 million dollars, or $217 for each
lost or stolen record.6 Forty-nine percent of those breaches oc-
curred as a result of a malicious attack.7 Hacking also affects
consumers: according to an IC3 report,8 the FBI received 262,813
consumer complaints in 2013, in which consumers reported a total
of $781,841,611 in losses.9
Trends in cybercrime indicate that rates of attack will continue to
increase, and that these attacks will grow more sophisticated.10
Hackers have recently employed newer schemes, including spear
phishing,11 emails containing embedded hyperlinks, “watering-hole
attacks,”12 and other sophisticated tactics. Moreover, according to
the Vice President of Dell’s Public Sector Software division,
“‘malware is going to become the tool of choice . . . because it’s
easy to build” and “the level of sophistication for malware is going
6. Ponemon Institute, 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: United States, IBM, 1 (May 2015),
http://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en/sew03055usen/SEW03055USEN.pdf.
7. Id. at 2.
8. See FBI, FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center 2013 Report, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT
CENTER, (Nov. 9, 2014 8:51 PM), https://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/
2013_IC3Report.pdf.
9. Id. at 3.
10. See Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, SYMANTEC, at 5; WARREN L. DAVIS IV &
DANIEL M. DUNLAVY, HYBRID METHODS FOR CYBERSECURITY ANALYSIS LDRD FINAL REPORT 7
(2014).
11. Spear phishing is “an email that appears to be from an individual or business that
you know” but is actually from hackers seeking “credit card and bank account numbers,
passwords, and . . . financial information.” Spear Phishing: Scam, Not Sport, NORTON BY SY-
MANTEC, http://us.norton.com/spear-phishing-scam-not-sport/article (last visited Apr. 8,
2016).
12. A watering-hole attack is “a targeted attack designed to compromise users within a
specific industry or function by infecting a website they typically visit and luring them to a
malicious site.” Threat #6 Watering Hole, PROOFPOINT THREATINSIGHT, (Nov. 9, 2014 10:43
PM), https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/introduction-to-threats.
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to become higher and higher.’”13 These trends indicate that, not
only are hacking costs not going anywhere, but they are likely on
track to increase.
2. Qualitative Costs
Damage from data breaches extends beyond the quantitative and
also includes qualitative losses. Data breaches frequently cause a
public relations ‘nightmare,’ as both investor and consumer confi-
dences in the corporation typically plummet following a breach.14
Cyberattacks may also significantly undermine a company’s compet-
itive advantage—reflected by a host of losses, including trade
secrets, drop of stock prices, and loss of jobs.15
3. Case Study: The Target Breach
The December 2013 Target data breach illustrates the severe
costs that arise from hacks. In that attack, sophisticated hackers in-
stalled malicious software on Target’s network, allowing them to
steal forty million credit and debit card numbers, in addition to
email addresses, login credentials, and other PII.16 In total, the
breach compromised the PII of about seventy million customers.17
Unsurprisingly, this breach shook the corporation. Executive em-
ployees, including the CEO and CIO, lost their jobs.18 Members of
the board came under fire.19 Law enforcement and other govern-
ment entities, including the Department of Justice, Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) investigated the incident.20 The breach also caused a wave of
13. Aaron Boyd, Malware Getting More Advanced, Easier to Use in 2015, FEDERAL TIMES (Jan.
19, 2015), http://www.federaltimes.com/story/government/cybersecurity/2015/01/19/
malware-attacks-advanced-2015/21108035/.
14. See Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, supra note 10, at 13.
15. See Sam Young, Contemplating Corporate Disclosure Obligations Arising from Cybersecurity
Breaches, 38 J. CORP. L. 659, 661 (2013).
16. Paul Ziobro & Danny Yadron, Target Now Says 70 Million People Hit in Data Breach,
WALL STREET J., (Jan. 10, 2014, 8:36 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270
2303754404579312232546392464.
17. Id.; see also Teri Radichel, Case Study: Critical Controls that Could Have Prevented Target
Breach, SANS INST. 1, 2 (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/
casestudies/case-study-critical-controls-prevented-target-breach-35412.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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disruption to other industries, including the banking sector.21
Banks were not only required to reimburse customers for their
losses, but also had to issue new credit cards to those affected by the
breach, costing hundreds of millions of dollars.22 Banks responded
by suing Target.23
Consumers also felt the enormous impact as the number of iden-
tity thefts multiplied.24 Months after the breach, studies revealed
decreases in consumer perception of Target’s customer service,
pricing, product selection, quality, and general reputation.25 Tar-
get’s earnings plummeted; fourth quarter 2013 earnings dropped
forty-six percent.26 Target’s breach provides a valuable lesson in the
serious qualitative and quantitative losses that network breaches can
inflict.
B. How Do Breaches Happen?
Both state and non-state actors perpetrate cyberattacks.27 Hack-
ers may be domestic or international and may act as individuals, as
part of a broader organization, or as “insiders.”28 Malicious insiders,
typically disgruntled employees, seek to exact revenge or to profit
from white-collar criminal activities such as identity theft.29 Crimi-
nal organizations also play a role in a substantial portion of data
breaches; a Symantec report noted that “[m]ore than [ninety] per-
cent of records breached in 2008 involved groups identified by law
enforcement as organized crime.”30 In addition, some hackers be-
long to collectives such as Anonymous or LulzSec, entities primarily





25. Adriana Cheng, Target Data Breach Has Lingering Effect on Customer Service, Reputation
Scores, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 2, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/behindthe
storefront/2014/04/02/target-data-breach-has-lingering-effect-on-customer-service-reputa
tion-scores/.
26. SANS INST., supra note 17, at 4.
27. Facilitating Cyber Threat Information Sharing and Partnering with the Private Sector to Pro-
tect Critical Infrastructure: An Assessment of DHS Capabilities Before the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Prot., & Sec. Tech. of the House Comm. on Homeland Sec’y, 113th Cong. 8 (2013).
28. Id.
29. Symantec, Anatomy of a Data Breach: Why Breaches Happen and What to Do About It,
SYMANTEC, 5 (2009), http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-anato
my_of_a_data_breach_WP_20049424-1.en-us.pdf.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Swathi Padmanabhan, Hacking for Lulz: Employing Expert Hackers to Combat Cyber Terror-
ism, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 191, 193–94, 199–204 (2012).
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large number of attacks on American corporations,32 and many
commentators have pointed to China’s role in particular.33 Attacks
attributable to China alone purportedly account for one trillion
dollars in intellectual property theft per year.34
Hackers’ motives are as varied as the perpetrators themselves.
Some are motivated by profit.35 Individuals and organized criminal
enterprises may seek to sell stolen data (e.g., credit card numbers,
PII, or intellectual property) on the black market.36 Further, some
hackers may seek to steal intellectual property or trade secrets to
enhance their competitive advantage,37 while others are motivated
by “bragging rights” or glory in the hacker community.38 Groups
such as Anonymous hack in an attempt to “make political state-
ments, cause laughter, and expose holes in the security protocols of
both governments and businesses.”39 Finally, state actors or ter-
rorists may vie to obtain confidential intelligence, a goal with
potential national security implications.40
C. Existing Defense Strategies
Cyberdefense strategies fall into two main categories: active and
passive defense.41 Passive defense strategies generally encompass
those strategies that block intruders from entering a network,
whereas active defense strategies involve corporations proactively
engaging hackers.  The sections that follow examine these strate-
gies and how corporations may employ them.




36. LILLIAN ABLON, MARTIN C. LIBICKI & ANDREA A. GOLAY, MARKETS FOR CYBERCRIME
TOOLS AND STOLEN DATA: HACKERS’ BAZAAR 4, 8–9 (2014); see also Sean L. Harrington, Cyber
Security Active Defense: Playing with Fire or Sound Risk Management?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, *1
(2014) (noting that banks are the most commonly targeted organizations).
37. See Facilitating Cyber Threat Information Sharing and Partnering with the Private Sector to
Protect Critical Infrastructure: An Assessment of DHS Capabilities Before the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Prot., & Sec. Tech. of the House Comm. on Homeland Sec’y, 113th Cong. 8, 7 (2013).
38. Id.
39. Padmanabhan, supra note 31, at 198.
40. Id. at 194.
41. Jan E. Messerschmidt, Note, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory Hacking by Non-State Actors
as Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275,
290–91 (2013).
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1. Passive Defense
Corporations use several passive defense strategies that employ
perimeters and sensors to block hackers and alert systems security
personnel of potential breaches.42 Those strategies typically fall into
one of four categories: “system access controls, data access controls,
security administration, and secure system design.”43
First, system access controls include several intuitive, but critical,
security practices which provide for identification and authentica-
tion.44 System access controls “prevent unauthorized users from
getting into a system, and force authorized users to be security con-
scious.”45 For example, a system will deny access to undefined
users.46 Password standards also furnish access control. Standards
include the required modification of default passwords, minimum
password length and complexity, and the periodic change of pass-
words for all user accounts.47 A system might also require users to
employ devices such as tokens or biometric data such as finger-
prints or retina scans to log in.48
Second, data access controls require authorization.49 Accord-
ingly, users cannot access files without the proper assignment of
rights. Unlike system access controls, data access controls restrict
network users’ abilities to read or edit particular files on the
system.50
42. See Teplinsky, infra note 139, at 314; Lieutenant Commander Matthew J. Sklerov,
Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses
Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 2010 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 n.5 (2009).
43. Id. at 21.
44. Id. at 22.
45. Id.
46. Access control systems employ authentication processes to deny some users because
they are “undefined,” or because they do not have any designated label in the system. Legacy
Authentication, CHECK POINT SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES, https://sc1.checkpoint.com/docu
ments/R76/CP_R76_SGW_WebAdmin/6721.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2016); Fundamentals of
Information Systems Security: Access Control Practices, WIKIBOOKS, http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/
Fundamentals_of_Information_Systems_Security/Access_Control_Systems#Access_Control_
Practices (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
47. Fundamentals of Information Systems Security: Access Control Practices, WIKIBOOKS, http://
en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Fundamentals_of_Information_Systems_Security/Access_Control_
Systems#Access_Control_Practices (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
48. Sklerov, supra note 42, at 22.  According to Sklerov, tokens “contain electronic code
that allows access [to] a system, and may even be so sophisticated as to continually calculate
new passwords based on time of day or secure algorithms. The computer system being ac-
cessed will have matching information to the security device, and will grant access once the
petitioning party’s password matches.” Id. at 22 n.130.
49. Id. at 23.
50. See, e.g, Thomson Reuters Data Access Control System (DACS), (DACS, Open DACS Permis-
sions Server, DACS On-Demand): Administering Your Enterprise Information Flows, THOMSON
898 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:4
The third type of passive defense, security administration, repre-
sents “the human side of computer security.”51 Security
administration techniques require that an organization educate
personnel on best practices, as well as write and enforce security
policy.52 Further, security administration involves “penetration test-
ing” and preparing and planning for disasters.53 Security
administration plays a critical role in thwarting malware and social
engineering attacks, which rely upon employees to unwittingly give
hackers system access.54
Fourth and lastly, corporations employ secure system design,
which defends networks with both hardware and software.55 For ex-
ample, network segmentation and gateways56 along the network
constitute important system design features that separate portions
of the network that contain sensitive information.57 Further exam-
ples include anti-virus programs,58 encryption programs,59
firewalls,60 and intrusion detection systems.61
REUTERS (2012), http://thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/tr-
com-financial/dacs.pdf.
51. Sklerov, supra note 42, at 23.
52. Id. at 23–24.
53. Id. Penetration testing is defined as “the process of attempting to gain access to
resources without knowledge of usernames, passwords and other normal means of ac-
cess . . . . [T]he goal of a penetration test is to increase the security of the computing
resources being tested.” Penetration Testing: Assessing Your Overall Security Before Attackers Do,
SANS INST. 3 (June 2006), http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/penetra-
tion-testing-assessing-security-attackers-34635.
54. Boyd, supra note 13.
55. Sklerov, supra note 42, at 24.
56. A gateway is “implemented at the boundary of a network to manage all the data
communication that is routed internally or externally from that network.” Gateway,
TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/5358/gateway (last visited Apr. 8,
2016).
57. See Sklerov, supra note 42, at 24 nn.151–52; Network Segmentation, SECURE STATE,
http://www.securestate.com/Services/Risk%20Management/Pages/Network-Segmentation
.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
58. Anti-virus software “keeps hackers out by checking against a malicious code spotted
on computers . . . [b]ut hackers increasingly use novel bugs,” so antivirus software “catches
just 45% of cyberattacks.” Danny Yadron, Declaring Antivirus Software Dead, Firm Turns to Mini-
mizing Damage from Breaches, WALL STREET J. (May 4, 2014 10:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702303417104579542140235850578.
59. Encryption programs encrypt files on the system in a plethora of different ways,
depending on the manufacturer of the encryption system. Sharon D. Nelson & John W.
Simek, Law Office Security: Building the Castle Moat, VT. B.J. 25, 29, 31 (2002).
60. Firewalls are “software or software/hardware installations that investigate the net-
work traffic and make a decision to allow it through or block it . . . [t]ypically, firewalls are
placed at the first external network entry point, thereby protecting all internal resources.” Id.
at 27–28.
61. Id.
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2. Active Defense
Parties engage in active defense when they use electronic force to
counterattack62 before, during, or in retaliation to a cyberattack.63
Active defense proponents classify these strategies into three cate-
gories: detection and forensics, deception, and attack
termination.64
Detection and forensics involves threat assessment or attack attri-
bution to identify potential or successful attackers.65 This
investigative work can include both local and remote intelligence
gathering.66 In local intelligence gathering, corporate security pro-
fessionals may look to a company’s network traffic data and
malware.67 Honeypots—“decoy servers or systems set up to gather
information regarding an attacker or intruder”—provide another
example of a local intelligence gathering method.68 Security profes-
sionals deploy honeypots to attract hackers and identify them based
on patterns of practice unique to an individual hacker.69 Honeypots
contain different types of documents, and accordingly provide the
opportunity to observe which files intruders attempt to take from
the network.70 Honeypots may therefore help security professionals
attribute attacks to particular hackers and better understand their
motives.71
Corporations may also reach outside of their networks to gather
information and evidence on attackers.72 In such cases, corporate
cyber professionals intrude upon an attacker’s server and “take any
number of actions, including scanning the computer, loading
software on it, removing data, encrypting data, deleting data, and
stopping the computer from functioning.”73 Security professionals
may also use a hacker’s own computer camera to photograph the
62. Sklerov, supra note 42, at 21–22.
63. Irving Lachow, Active Cyber Defense: A Framework for Policymakers, CTR. FOR NEW AM.
SECURITY 1 (Feb. 2013), http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Active
CyberDefense_Lachow_0.pdf.
64. See, e.g., id. at 5–6.
65. Id. at 5.




68. Intrusion Detection FAQ: What is a Honeypot, SANS INST., https://www.sans.org/secur-
ity-resources/idfaq/what-is-a-honeypot/1/9 (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
69. Lachow, supra note 63, at 5.
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hacker.74 Another active defense strategy, “beaconing,” occurs when
stolen files provide their own location.75 Those documents may ulti-
mately self-destruct as well.76 Under such a security model,
corporations could also execute a “denial of service attack” or dis-
patch a virus against the hacker.77 Notably, “[r]emotely gathering
intelligence or actively tracing an attacker without the parties’ coop-
eration or knowledge requires breaking into systems to review logs
and seek[ing] traces of the malware or evidence of the network
attacks.”78
Cybersecurity professionals may also practice deception as an ac-
tive defense strategy. For example, a company might plant files on
its system that contain inaccurate information.79 This false informa-
tion adjusts the cost-benefit analysis that hackers conduct, as it
alters the potential value of the information obtained from a poten-
tial hack.80
Lastly, a corporation can use attack termination strategies. Exam-
ples of attack termination strategies include severing the
connection between an infected corporate computer and the at-
tacker’s server, and installing patches on other infected computers
outside of the network.81
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. What Laws Currently Govern Cybersecurity?
The legal boundaries for network security have evolved signifi-
cantly over the past few decades. Since 1986, Congress has
expanded the scope of criminal sanctions pertaining to data theft
and intrusions. This Part describes some of the most important fed-
eral legislation governing this field. It then notes various cases in
this area that demonstrate loopholes and oversights in the law. Al-
though effective in some respects, these laws leave gaps in
enforcement that render corporations vulnerable to attack and fail
74. Sean L. Harrington, Cyber Security Active Defense: Playing with Fire or Sound Risk Manage-
ment?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2014).
75. Id. at 11. Harrington discusses the ambiguities surrounding the potential legality or
illegality of beaconing. Id. at 9–10.
76. Id. at 9.
77. These attacks would functionally cause the hacker’s computer to stop working.
Shane McGee, Randy V. Sabett & Anand Shah, Adequate Attribution: A Framework for Developing
a National Policy for Private Sector Use of Active Defense, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 12 (2013).
78. Westby, supra note 66.
79. Lachow, supra note 63, at 6.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 6–7.
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to provide adequate notice of which defense strategies remain le-
gally permissible.82
1. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030
Congress passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in
1986 to “protect[ ] computers in which there is a federal interest—
federal computers, bank computers, and computers used in or af-
fecting interstate and foreign commerce.  The Act shields the
computers from trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from
being corruptly used as instruments of fraud.”83 More specifically,
the CFAA criminalizes (1) “obtaining national security informa-
tion,” (2) “accessing a computer and obtaining information,” (3)
“trespassing in a government computer,” (4) “accessing a computer
to defraud and obtain value,” (5) “intentionally damaging by know-
ing transmission,” (6) “recklessly damaging by intentional access,”
(7) “negligently causing damage and loss by intentional access,” (8)
“trafficking in passwords,” and (9) “extortion involving
computers.”84
According to a Department of Justice report, lawmakers in-
tended this statute to protect against computer crimes while
maintaining the integrity of the federalist system.85 Legislators thus
left space in this statute for the states to address computer crimes by
constraining federal jurisdiction to cases creating a compelling fed-
eral interest.86 Since the Act’s enactment in 1986, Congress has
amended the CFAA eight times, most recently in 2008.87 One of
these amendments added a civil cause of action.88
Violations of the CFAA can result in a misdemeanor or a felony
charge.89 If the information obtained is worth less than $5,000, the
82. See Shane Huang, Proposing a Self-Help Privilege for Victims of Cyber Attacks, 82 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1229, 1233 (2014) (noting that “current law is ambiguous regarding private
sector counterattacks”).
83. CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 1
(2014).
84. See OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, PROSECUTING COM-
PUTER CRIMES 3 (2010) (internal formatting omitted).
85. Id. at 1.
86. Id. at 1–2.
87. Id. at 2.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2008); see also Deborah F. Buckham, Annotation, Validity, Con-
struction, and Application of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.A. §1830), 174 AM. L. REP.
FED. 101 (2001).
89. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 84, at 20.
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perpetrator may be charged with a misdemeanor.90 However, if the
information is worth more than $5,000, if “commercial advantage
or private financial gain” motivated the crime, or if the perpetrator
committed the intrusion in furtherance of a separate violation,
then the government may charge a felony.91
2. Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511
The federal government can also prosecute corporate networks
intrusions under the Wiretap Act.92 This statute applies to any per-
son who attempts or successfully intercepts “any wire, oral, or
electronic communication.”93 Under this statute, computer network
transmissions are considered a type of electronic communication.94
This statute provides for the prosecution of any person who “in-
tentionally discloses, endeavors to disclose, to any other person the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing
or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion.”95 Similarly, this statute prohibits the intentional use of the
illegally obtained contents of an electronic communication.96
A prosecutor may charge a perpetrator of a Wiretap Act violation
with a felony that carries a maximum prison sentence of five years
and a monetary fine of $250,000 for individual violators and
$500,000 for organizations.97
3. Stored Communications Act
(Electronic Communications Privacy Act),
18 U.S.C. § 2701
The Stored Communications Act addresses the security of stored
Internet communications, such as emails.98 In addition to the pro-
tection of communications, this Act guards users who outsource
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
91. Id.
92. See OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 84, at 59.
93. Id. at 60.
94. Id. at 59.
95. Id. at 73.
96. Id. at 77.
97. Id. at 87.
98. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208–11 (2004).
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data storage.99 According to the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys,
“[a]t heart, section 2701 protects the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of these communications stored by providers of elec-
tronic communication services pending the ultimate delivery to
their intended recipients.”100 This Act allows the federal govern-
ment to charge unauthorized or excessive, intentional access to a
“facility through which an electronic communication service is pro-
vided” and which “thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized
access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in elec-
tronic storage in such system.”101 Individuals committing these acts
for commercial gain or advantage face felony charges.102
4. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1028
Under the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, a per-
son may not “knowingly transfe[r], posse[ss], or us[e], without
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with
the intent to commit or to aid and abet . . . any unlawful activity.”103
Given that many hacking incidents involve the theft of personal in-
formation,104 the government can use this statute to prosecute such
crimes.105
A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028 can result in imprisonment for up
to fifteen years in addition to fines—for example, where the value
of the stolen information is of a value of $1,000 or more.106 Infor-
mation that comprises a value of under $1,000 carries a maximum
of a five-year term of imprisonment.107
99. Id. at 1213–14.
100. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 84, at 89.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2002).
102. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 84, at 89.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006).
104. Personal information often includes social security numbers, dates of birth, driver’s
licenses, or biometric data. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 84, at 97.
105. Id. at 96.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1028(b) (2006).
107. Id.
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5. Access Device Fraud Statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1029
The Access Device Fraud Statute imposes criminal penalties for
those engaging in activities such as phishing.108 More specifically,
the statute prohibits a person who knowingly and intentionally “de-
fraud[s], produces, uses, or traffics in one or more counterfeit
access devices.”109 The Access Device Fraud Statute (ADFS) defines
access devices as “any card, plate, code, account number, electronic
serial number . . . personal identification number,” or “other means
of account access” that can be used to acquire “money, goods, ser-
vices, or any other thing of value.”110 Hence, this statute applies to
intrusions that subsequently result in the sale of any bank account
or credit card.111 Prosecutions under the Access Device Fraud Stat-
ute can result in maximum of a ten or fifteen year prison term,
depending on the precise section of the statute violated.112
6. Other Statutes
In addition to the above-described statutes, the government uses
several other statutes to address network intrusions. First, under the
Wire Fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1343), the government can punish
Internet-based fraud as a stand-alone crime and as a predicate
RICO charge.113 Next, the government can pursue charges against
hackers under the Communication Interference Act (18 U.S.C.
§ 1362).114 This statute prohibits the willful or malicious destruction
of any means of communication “operated or controlled by the
United States.”115 Because of the broad language of this statute, this
charge would likely apply to many corporate communication lines
as well.116 Finally, in October 2015, the Senate passed the Cyber-
security Information Sharing Act (CISA).117 (This bill still faced
108. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 84, at 102–03.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (2012).
110. Id.
111. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 84, at 97.
112. Id. at 103.
113. Id. at 109–10.
114. Id. at 110–11.
115. Id. at 111.
116. Id.
117. Aarti Shahani, Senate Approves Cybersecurity Bill: What You Need to Know, NPR (Oct. 27,
2015 6:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015 /10/27/452338925/
senate-approves-cybersecurity-bill-what-you-need-to-know.
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vetogates, including the House of Representatives, as well as a po-
tential veto by President Obama at the time this Note was
published.)118 CISA aims to promote voluntary, but not mandatory,
corporate cyber threat information sharing.119 Moreover, it elimi-
nates any legal liability for corporations who hand over private
consumer data to the government.120
B. What Loopholes Persist in Spite of Legislation?
As the above-described statutes demonstrate, Congress legislated
on a number of cybersecurity issues. In spite of these efforts, stat-
utes often target narrow problems and do not adequately protect
specific corporate cybersecurity needs or clarify their defensive
boundaries.121 These failures arise for two primary reasons. First,
defendant hackers can exploit technical difficulties between their
activity and that specified under the statutory scheme. Second, Con-
gress oftentimes did not intend for these statutes to target the
activity at issue.
In P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal Superstore
LLC, the Third Circuit held that plaintiffs could not prove their
claim that a former employee and consultant violated the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act.122 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs could not prove that defendants intruded upon the net-
work “knowingly and with intent to defraud,” and “as a result . . .
furthered the intended fraudulent conduct and obtained anything
of value.”123 The court stated that, without proof of the alleged tak-
ing or use of information by the defendants, who subsequently
started a rival business, the plaintiffs could not meet their
burden.124
A year earlier, in United States v. Larry Lee Ropp, a federal district
court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment for
118. See Andy Greenberg & Yael Grauer, CISA Security Bill Passes Senate With Privacy Flaws




121. To date, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, which has not yet been enacted
as law, is the most relevant cybersecurity statute passed by Congress.
122. 428 F.3d 504, 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2005).
123. Id. at 509.
124. Id.
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Wiretap Act violations.125 The government alleged that the defen-
dant installed a keylogger on the victim’s desktop.126 The court
concluded, however, that the defendant did not violate the Wiretap
Act because “the transmission of keystrokes from a keyboard to a
computer’s processing unit is not the transmission of an electronic
signal by a system that affects interstate commerce,” and therefore
did not qualify as an electronic communication.127
Finally, in Hilderman v. Enea TekSci, Inc., a district court narrowly
defined the scope of the Stored Communications Act.128 The court
held that a laptop did not qualify as a “facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided,” and therefore read-
ing email messages stored on the laptop could not constitute a
violation of the Stored Communications Act.129 The court also de-
termined that emails did not suffice as “electronic storage,” because
they were not “in temporary, intermediate storage.”130
Congress did not design the statutes employed in the aforemen-
tioned cases to target the specific problem of corporate
cybersecurity, but rather to address other niche security problems.
The Identity Theft and Deterrence Act, as well as the Access Device
Fraud Statute, exemplify the ill-fit between the legislative intent un-
derlying current statutes and corporate cybersecurity.
Although the Identity Theft and Deterrence Act can help the
federal government curb hacks, legislative history reveals its limita-
tions.131 Namely, legislators passed the Act to target the specific
problem of identity theft: “a major purpose of this section is to
criminalize offenses involving Federal identification documents
used ‘to support the creation of a new identity.’”132 In United States
v. Phillips, for example, the government successfully prosecuted the
defendant’s enormous hack under this statute only because the sto-
len data also included social security numbers.133 There, a university
student hacked hundreds of computers at the University of Texas at
125. United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
126. “Ropp placed the [keylogger] on the cable that connects [victim’s] keyboard to her
computer’s central processing unit . . . .  [T]he [keylogger] recorded and stored the elec-
tronic impulses traveling down the cable between her keyboard and the computer to which it
was attached.  The [keylogger], in this way, ‘eavesdrops’ on the person typing messages into
the computer.” Id. at 831.
127. Id. at 832.
128. Hilderman v. Enea TekSci, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1204 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1205.
131. See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, S. Rep. 105–274, 105th Cong.
(2nd Sess. 1998).
132. Id.
133. United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 218–19, 225 (5th Cir. 2007).
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Austin.134 In the course of these intrusions, the student used scan-
ning tools to steal encrypted data.135 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
defendant’s conviction pursuant to the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030) and the Identity Theft and Assumption De-
terrence Act (18 U.S.C. § 1028) for “possession of an identification
document containing stolen Social Security numbers.”136
Much like the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act,
the Access Device Fraud Statute (ADFS) serves the narrow purpose
of curbing identity theft, and moreover, legislators designed the
ADFS specifically to protect financial institutions.137 In fact, the gov-
ernment agency that enforces the ADFS, the Secret Service,
specifically points to the ADFS as a tool to combat the financial
industry’s significant annual losses from credit card fraud.138 The
narrowly proscribed purpose of the statute makes it of limited use
as a tool to combat the diverse nature of cyberattacks.
Although Congress has passed legislation that peripherally ad-
dresses issues that relate to corporate cybersecurity, no statutes have
passed to date that fully address the unique problems corporations
face. Furthermore, none of these statutes address which types of
strategies corporations may or may not employ in protecting their
networks. Consequently, corporations remain vulnerable to
breaches.
C. Recent Efforts: Legislative Attempts & Executive Orders
1. Legislative Attempts
Although cybersecurity has attracted significant political and me-
dia attention, Congress has not enacted new legislation in several
years. Close to one hundred bills have been introduced to Congress
addressing the ever-growing cybersecurity threat to both private in-
dustry and government affairs, but privacy concerns,139 among
other problems, have prevented the successful passage of a law.
Congress may have taken a step forward, however, with the Senate’s
recent passage of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act.140
134. Id. at 217.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 218–19, 225.
137. See Criminal Investigations, U.S. SECRET SERVICE, http://www.secretservice.gov/investi-
gation/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
138. See id.
139. Melanie J. Teplinsky, Fiddling on the Roof: Recent Developments in Cybersecurity, 2 AM. U.
BUS. L. REV. 225, 302 (2013).
140. See Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015).
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2. Executive Orders
In reaction to Congressional failures, President Obama issued
several executive orders that confront the ongoing problem of
cybersecurity.141 Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical Infra-
structure Cybersecurity” (2013), provided for the creation of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cyber Se-
curity Framework, a voluntary set of standards in best security
practices for critical infrastructure.142 NIST officially issued those
standards in February 2014.143 In October 2014 President Obama
authorized Executive Order 13681, aimed to protect consumer fi-
nancial transactions from identity theft.144 This order provided
parties to federal government transactions with “enhanced security
features, including chip-and-PIN technology.”145 In February 2015,
President Obama issued Executive Order 13691, which built upon
Executive Order 13636.146 This Order sought to promote informa-
tion sharing within the private sector and between the private
sector and the government.147 The process advocated under Execu-
tive Order 13691 involves cooperation between Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers, which are organized by the industry
sector, and the Department of Homeland Security.148
Additionally, in late February 2015, President Obama created a
new national intelligence center—the Cyber Threat Intelligence In-
tegration Center (CTIIC)—under the authority of the Director of
National Intelligence.149 This agency “focus[es] on ‘connecting the
dots’ regarding malicious foreign cyber threats to the nation and
141. See e.g., James Arden Barnett Jr., Cyber Security: Fixing Policy with New Principles and
Organization, in RECENT TRENDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 25, 25 (Aspatore 2014).
142. Id. at 1–2; Exec. Order 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739; NIST, Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, NIST, 3, http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/
cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
143. Id.
144. Exec. Order 13,681, 79 Fed. Reg. 63,491 (2014).
145. Id.
146. See Exec. Order 13,691, 79 Fed. Reg. 9,349 (2015).
147. Fact Sheet: Executive Order Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/12/
fact-sheet-executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-inform (last visited Apr. 8,
2016).
148. See Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECUR-
ITY, http://www.dhs.gov/isao (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
149. Fact Sheet: Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 25 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/25/fact-sheet-cyber-threat-intelli-
gence-integration-center (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). Further discussion regarding the CTIIC
is included in Part III.
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cyber incidents affecting U.S. national interests.”150 The Presiden-
tial Memorandum lists the functions of the CTIIC as (1) providing
analysis of cyber threats, (2) supporting other government entities
in their investigations, (3) overseeing intelligence sharing initia-
tives, and (4) working to promote information sharing.151 However,
“the CTIIC will not be an operational center” and “will not collect
intelligence, manage incident response efforts, direct investiga-
tions, or replace other functions currently performed by existing
departments, agencies, or government cyber centers.”152
Finally, in April 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order
13694, which allows the Secretary of the Treasury to authorize sanc-
tions on individuals or entities that use cyber tactics to threaten
U.S. national security.153 The New York Times described this execu-
tive order as a measure to treat hackers “the same way [the U.S.
government] does terrorists and drug cartels.”154
Each of these executive orders attempts to address America’s
massive hacking problem, but none address corporate cyberdefense
strategies.
3. Remaining Loopholes
Although President Obama’s executive orders have made signifi-
cant strides towards a more coherent and complete approach to
corporate cybersecurity, loopholes remain. Corporations lack the
requisite protection and guidance regarding boundaries for cyber-
security strategies.
Moreover, the federal government has only passed mandatory
cybersecurity requirements for a small sector of private industry.155
150. Id.
151. Presidential Memorandum – Establishment of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/
25/presidential-memorandum-establishment-cyber-threat-intelligence-integrat (last visited
Apr. 8, 2016).
152. Fact Sheet: Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 25,
2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/25/fact-sheet-cyber-threat-in-
telligence-integration-center (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
153. Fact Sheet: Executive Order Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/fact-sheet-executive-order-blocking-property-certain-per
sons-engaging-si (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
154. Vikas Bajaj, To Catch a Hacker, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (Apr. 1, 2015, 1:44 PM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/to-catch-a-hacker/?_r=0.
155. See Teplinsky, supra note 139, at 276.
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Although some regulations govern the financial156 and health157
spheres, most corporations’ network security policies arise from
self-regulation.158 Even NIST’s cybersecurity framework is a volun-
tary set of standards that mostly pertains to critical infrastructure
provider networks.159 One exception is that corporations must now
disclose the occurrence of a network breach.160 While the CTIIC’s
creation represents a step in the right direction, the center prima-
rily acts to promote information sharing among government
agencies and between the public and private sectors.161 This contin-
ued gap in regulatory infrastructure leaves both personal consumer
data and corporate assets vulnerable.
Also, the lack of regulatory guidance for corporations makes the
legality of several security tools uncertain. Corporations may not
fully understand the parameters of permissible active defense strat-
egies,162 and thereby unwittingly engage in illegal activity without
thorough and clear regulations.163 Additionally, if corporations do
not feel adequately protected by the current legal infrastructure,
they may be more likely to intentionally resort to illegal strate-
gies.164 In fact, “[p]rivate companies, including those listed on the
156. For example, in 2001 Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Billey Act, which com-
pelled security for financial institutions.  Those financial institutions were to “implement a
comprehensive written information security program to: (1) ensure the security and confi-
dentiality of customer information; (2) protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to
the security or integrity of such information; and (3) protect against unauthorized access to
or use of such information.” Smedinghoff, supra note 4, at 110.
157. In 2003 Congress passed HIPAA Security Regulations, which “require covered enti-
ties to (1) ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic health
information, (2) protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security
or integrity of such information, and (3) protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or
disclosures of such information that are not permitted or required.” Id.
158. Teplinsky, supra note 139, at 276.
159. Cybersecurity Framework, NIST, http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/ (last visited
Apr. 8, 2016).
160. Teplinsky, supra note 139, at 277–78.
161. See Presidential Memorandum – Establishment of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration
Center, supra note 151; Tom Risen, New Agency to Aid in Battle Against Hackers, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Feb. 10, 2015, 4:25 PM), available at http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2015/02/10/new-cybersecurity-agency-to-aid-in-battle-against-hackers; Dustin Volz, What a
New $35 Million Agency Is Expected to Do for US Cyber Defense, DEF. ONE (Feb. 10, 2015), http://
www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/02/what-new-35-million-agency-expected-do-us-
cyber-defense/105048/.
162. See, e.g., West, supra note 3, at 130–32 (discussing the contemporary use of active
defense strategies and corporate hacking back).
163. See id. at 133.
164. See Messerschmidt, supra note 41, at 277 (describing how Google disclosed that it
hacks back); see also Huang, supra note 82, at 1246, 1251 (noting that “[a]mbiguous legal
standards . . . have not stopped security professionals from engaging in some legally question-
able tactics,” and that “[s]ecurity software vendors sell tools capable of real-time hackback”).
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Fortune 500, have increasingly turned to self-help measures in re-
sponse to cyber intrusions.”165 The survey of cases above
demonstrates that certain types of hacking activities may be difficult
to punish under the current scheme. As previously described, it
may be difficult for corporations to prove the actual “harm” or in-
tent element required for criminal prosecution under the current
statutory framework.
III. REFORMS & SOLUTIONS
A. Problems with Active Defense
Active defense strategies will not resolve the gaps corporations
face in the current legal climate. These strategies, including hack-
ing back, do not accord with well-developed common law ‘defense
of property’ principles and can create a host of negative externali-
ties. These public policy concerns counsel against allowing
corporations to implement many active defense strategies.
1. Application of Common Law Property Law Principles
Common law principles can help identify the most appropriate
boundaries for corporate cyberdefense, and case law developed
over the course of generations offers a fundamental understanding
of how society approaches the defense of property.
Defense of property principles provide a more applicable guide
than defense of self. Some commentators166 argue that, in the
cyberdefense context, self defense is the applicable standard under
which these questions should be addressed.  The crux of this argu-
ment is twofold: (1) that the United States government cannot
adequately protect corporations because officials would be hesitant
to use force against foreign nations; and (2) even assuming that the
government would not be hesitant, it would lack adequate re-
sources to defend against cyber threats.167
But defense of self principles should not apply in the corporate
cyberdefense realm because defense of self presupposes a threat to
life or limb.168 Defense of self requires a sense of immediacy; it as-
sumes that the contemplated action will mitigate or reduce, rather
165. Messerschmidt, supra note 41, at 277.
166. See McGee et al., supra note 77, at 4–5.
167. See West, supra note 3, at 125–28.
168. See 3A GILLESPIE MICH. CRIM. L. & PROC. § 91:51 (2d ed. 2014).
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than aggravate, the harm.169 It does not, however, contemplate ac-
tion in response to a harm already inflicted,170 as in a hacking back
scenario. Even when corporate cybersecurity professionals detect
intrusions while hackers remain in the network, active defense strat-
egies may still be inappropriate. As explained below, common law
principles prohibit most forms of force when used in defense of
property.
The most legally sound and logical application of these princi-
ples can be found in the common law reasonableness requirement
for any defense of real and personal property. That requirement
limits property owners’ available responses to intruders. Still, it may
be reasonable for a property owner to confine an individual to pre-
vent or end his intrusion on land or chattels.”171 But the
permissibility of this sort of apprehension is limited.172 For exam-
ple, in State v. Schloredt, the court found that a property owner was
not justified in attempting to shoot an intruder on his property.173
More specifically, the court stated that although a property owner
has the right to protect his property, he may not use more force
than is necessary.174 The court, moreover, eloquently described the
dangers of such behavior: “ ‘[s]elf-help has always been reckoned as
a perilous remedy owing to the stringent rules against its abuse’ [
. . . ] a trespass not involving the protection of a home does not
justify the use of a deadly weapon or the infliction of great bodily
harm.”175
Without the threat of injury to one’s person, use of force may be
unreasonable. Consider, for example, Katko v. Briney, where the
169. Consider, for example, the “retreat to the wall” principle of self defense.  In fact,
even the right to defend one’s own life and limb has caveats, such as the duty to “retreat to
the wall.”  This principle provides that “a man who, in the lawful pursuit of his business is
attacked by another, under circumstances which denote an intention to take away his life or
do him some enormous bodily harm, may lawfully kill the assailant, provided he uses all the
means in his power, otherwise to save his own life or prevent the intended harm; such as
retreating as far as he can.” 3A GILLESPIE MICH. CRIM. L. & PROC. § 91:51 (2d ed. 2014); see
also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Benoit, 892 N.E.2d 314, 326 (Mass. 2008). The “retreat to the
wall” principle has been abrogated in thirty-three states, however, under “stand-your-ground-
laws.” See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS,
PRELIMINARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2014). Those laws eliminate the duty to re-
treat, but still require an objectively reasonable threat or perceived threat to life or limb. See
id. at 9.
170. See 3A GILLESPIE MICH. CRIM. L. & PROC. § 91:51.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 80 (1977); see also Teel v. May Dep’t Stores Co.,
155 S.W.2d 74 (1941) (finding it reasonable for a department store owner to use reasonable
confinement in defense of property).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 79, 80 (1977).
173. State v. Schloredt, 111 P.2d 128, 131–32 (Wyo. 1941).
174. Id. at 131.
175. Id.
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court held that a “deadly spring gun or other mechanical device”
may not be used in defense of property.176 The defendant at-
tempted to protect an uninhabited home, which had been subject
to a host of break-ins and thefts.177 In response to these threats, the
defendant home owner boarded up windows and doors, hung ‘no
trespass’ signs,” and created a shotgun trap to injure intruders.178
When the plaintiff entered the house, the shotgun discharged and
the plaintiff intruder was severely injured.179  The Supreme Court
of Iowa ruled that a property possessor may use reasonable force to
resist a trespasser, but that here the force was excessive.180
Common law principles similarly limit the methods for recaptur-
ing property. Recapture is generally permitted when “a person
reasonably believes that he has been illegally disposed of real or
personal property by another.”181 However, recapture is limited to
circumstances of “hot pursuit,”182 and outside such circumstances,
the property owner must seek recourse in court.183
Such limitations imposed by common law in defense of property
logically apply to the corporate cyberdefense context when only
property, rather than life and limb, is in peril. Reasonable force
may only be used to prevent property loss. Therefore, network secur-
ity professionals may not use force against intruders after an
imminent threat has passed. These principles discredit many active
defense strategies.  For example, hacking back would not be per-
missible because it (1) does not respond to an immediate threat;
and (2) involves the intrusion upon another network, often with
the intent to cause serious harm or to recover data from the
hacker’s network. Similarly, traps such as hidden malware on corpo-
rate networks constitute unreasonable defense of property
strategies because they can easily destroy the machine or server
onto which they are installed.184 Moreover, where corporations mis-
attribute a threat, they may unwittingly cause disproportionate
176. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.6 (2d ed. 2015); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 79 (1977) (explaining that use of deadly force for the
intrusion of property may only be justified if it is believed that the intruder may cause death
or serious bodily injury to the actor or a third party).
177. Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Iowa 1979).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.; see generally Hooker v. Miller, 37 Iowa 613 (Iowa 1873); Wilder v. Gardner, 39 Ga.
App. 608 (Ga. Ct. App. 1929); State v. Beckham, 257 S.W. 817 (Mo. 1924).
181. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §10.6 (2d ed. 2015).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See The Offensive Approach to Cyber Security in Government and Private Industry, INFOSEC
INSTITUTE, http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/the-offensive-approach-to-cyber-security-in-
government-and-private-industry/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
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damage or threat to life and limb.185 If corporations unintentionally
hack a server engaged in infrastructural functions, for example
those supporting electrical plants, life and limb could be in danger
when such plants shut down.186
Generally, any active defense strategies that involve remote intru-
sions would likely be found unreasonable under defense of
property common law doctrine. Only two active defense strategies,
deception and local intelligence gathering, conform to defense of
property principles.
2. Public Policy Implications of Hacking Back
Beyond defense of property principles, public policy considera-
tions also counsel against corporate self-help strategies. Those
considerations include the following: (1) attribution problems that
might incur criminal and civil liability; (2) the better suited skills,
experience, and accountability of law-enforcement personnel; (3)
the creation of distorted incentives for hackers; and (4) the risk of
escalation, particularly in the international sphere.
One concern is that of attribution.187 Corporations may not have
adequate information, technology, procedures, or professionalism
to investigate hacking. Instead, they may unintentionally pursue
and hack back innocent parties.188 Attribution is especially difficult
in the context of hacking because hackers often use “compromised
computers of unwitting third parties.”189 Beyond the social costs of
this behavior, corporations may incur liability for such conduct. Pri-
vate parties or government actors may impose criminal or civil
liability against corporations who intrude or cause damage to their
networks while seeking retribution.
Our legal system has traditionally taken a dim view of such vigi-
lantism.190 Law enforcement and the court system are generally
better-trained and equipped to deal with investigating and assessing
185. See Messerschmidt, supra note 41, at 322–23.
186. See Bill to Reshape U.S. Cybersecurity, S. 773, 111th Cong. (2009) (explaining the
types of dangers posed to critical infrastructure when cyber attacks are executed).
187. McGee et al., supra note 77, at 5.
188. Attribution problems could result in corporations attacking white-hat hackers unin-
tentionally. See WILLIAM EASTTOM, NETWORK DEFENSE AND COUNTERMEASURES: PRINCIPLES AND
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culpability. Law enforcement officers can be held accountable
through official channels and rules.191 Criminal sanctions, and
more specifically, the threat of imprisonment, generally serve as a
powerful deterrent to criminal activity.192 If the government grants
corporations the right to hack back, corporations may prefer to en-
gage with hackers on their own, rather than report intrusions to law
enforcement. Therefore, hacking back could replace the criminal
justice system and remove a powerful disincentive to hack corpora-
tions. Moreover, allowing corporate vigilantism would eliminate
due process for accused parties.193 The founding fathers designed
our legal system to afford accused parties the benefit of the
doubt.194 Accordingly, self-help strategies contradict the founda-
tional philosophy of our judicial system.
One additional policy concern undermining our legal system’s
discomfort with self-help mechanisms is the risk of escalation.195
Corporate hacking back could result in an endless cycle of network
intrusions. This runs the risk of abuse—corporations could claim
that an intrusion justified a subsequent retributive hack. Moreover,
corporate actors might hack foreign state actors. Such behavior un-
dermines U.S. foreign policy, as domestic government actors would
no longer have control over what could be considered an act of
war.196 Corporate actors could potentially inspire tensions between
the United States and its allies, as well as its enemies.197 In Novem-
ber 2014, hackers, believed to have operated out of or been
supported by the government of North Korea, infiltrated both Sony
Entertainment’s US and worldwide servers.198 “The attackers took
terabytes of private data, deleted the original copies from Sony
191. See id. at n.98.
192. § 2 Definition, Elements of a Crime, Aims of Punishment, CCH INTERNATIONAL EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS CYBER LAW, 2013 WL 4296826.
193. See Badawi, supra note 190, at 21.
194. Moreover, civil defendants may not be held accountable unless a claim is proven by
the preponderance of the evidence, and criminal defendants must be proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362–63 (1970).
195. See McGee et al., supra note 77, at 36.
196. See generally Sklerov, supra note 42 (analyzing cyberattacks within the framework of
the law of war).
197. The Offensive Approach to Cyber Security in Government and Private Industry, INFOSEC IN-
STITUTE, http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/the-offensive-approach-to-cyber-security-in-
government-and-private-industry/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
198. Timothy B. Lee, The Sony Hack: How it Happened, Who is Responsible, and What We’ve
Learned, VOX (Dec. 17, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/12/14/7387945/sony-
hack-explained; Jose Pagliery, What Caused Sony Hack: What We Know Now, CNN (Dec. 29,
2014, 1:58 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/24/technology/security/sony-hack-facts/.
916 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:4
computers, and left messages threatening to release the informa-
tion if Sony did not comply with the attackers’ demands.”199
Moreover, hackers shut down Sony’s network for several days and
posted private information and films online.200 Although the Ameri-
can government attributed the attack to North Korea, the source of
the attack still remains unclear after extensive investigation.201 Such
a case demonstrates the serious risks of permitting corporations to
engage in hacking back. If Sony were permitted to hack back North
Korean networks, it could result in significant foreign policy dis-
cord. The United States already has a contentious relationship with
North Korea, and such delicate relationships should not fall into
the hands of corporate actors.
These significant costs demonstrate that active defense strategies,
including hacking back, will not provide the proper framework for
corporate cyberdefense.
B. Solutions
Because of these issues with active defense and hacking back, cor-
porations should instead rely on regulatory guidance regarding
permissible cyberdefense strategies. However, the problem is that
comprehensive regulatory guidance does not yet exist. The CTIIC
should utilize its expertise and functionality as an inter-agency data
repository to formulate regulations in conjunction with the FCC—
which has Congressionally delegated rulemaking authority—to clar-
ify the scope of permissible corporate cyberdefense strategies.
These regulations would have the capacity to evolve with the chang-
ing Internet landscape. This is because of the pliancy of regulations
relative to statutes. And a FCC regulatory process avoids vetogates,
as well as other complications of the political process. Critically,
closing legal loopholes will prevent corporations from relying on
risky self-help strategies and would require corporate defense strate-
gies to align with well-developed common law principles.
199. Lee, supra note 198.
200. Id.
201. Lily Hay Newman, What We Do and Don’t Know About the Sony Pictures Hack, SLATE
(Dec. 17, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/12/17/sony_pic
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1. Why an Agency is the Proper Vehicle for Reform
An analogy to a previously established administrative agency, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), provides a compelling
narrative of why this CTIIC-FCC partnership would serve as the
proper vehicle for reform.
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, the nation faced enor-
mous environmental troubles—pollutants created a diffuse
problem on an enormous scale and involved so many corporations
and individuals, that solving the problem must have seemed insur-
mountable. Then, in December 1970, Congress established the EPA
“to consolidate in one agency a variety of federal research, monitor-
ing, standard-setting and enforcement activities to ensure
environmental protection.”202 Clear guidance for corporations re-
sulted in enormous successes in environmental cleanup. For
example, the EPA has improved water standards and “the number
of Americans receiving water that met health standards went from
79 percent, in 1993, to 92 percent in 1998.”203
The CTIIC-FCC regulations would likely yield similar benefits as
those promulgated by the EPA. The data and resources the CTIIC
compiles, coupled with FCC regulatory authority and expertise,
would provide for such effective regulations.204 This agency solution
would likely result in better social and political outcomes than al-
lowing for corporate vigilantism.
2. What the FCC and CTIIC Should Do
The Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center should wield
its vast data repository and cybersecurity insights to formulate de-
tailed and extensive corporate cyberdefense regulations in
conjunction with the FCC.
First, in order to conform to the sound reasoning of common law
defense of property principles, corporations should be permitted to
continue to use passive defense strategies. Second, the CTIIC
should promulgate regulations that explicitly prohibit hacking
202. EPA History, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-
history (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
203. 40 Years of Achievements, 1970–2010, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.
epa.gov/40th/achieve.html [http://www.epa.gov/40th/achieve.html] (last visited Apr. 16,
2015).
204. Presidential Memorandum – Establishment of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center,
supra note 151.
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back, beaconing, honeypots, and most other active defense strate-
gies. Such regulations might clarify, for example, that while hacking
back is impermissible, strategies such as the use of deception and
local intelligence gathering remain acceptable. These clarifications
will help avoid corporate vigilantism, which holds the potential to
stress intricate foreign political relationships and impose enormous
externalities on third parties. Additionally, regulations may curb
corporate incentives to withhold information from government
actors.205
Third, these regulations should mandate extensive minimum se-
curity standards for corporations based on the CTIIC’s extensive
study and repository of expertise.206
3. Potential Criticisms of the Agency Approach
Critics will likely dismiss this proposed regulatory approach on
several grounds. Some may criticize the approach as expanding an
ever-growing administrative bureaucracy. Other critics may ex-
pound upon that negative perception and claim that government
actors are not best equipped to deal with such ever-changing, tech-
nologically complex, and numerous corporate cybersecurity
threats.
Criticism of the overgrowth of the administrative state fails to rec-
ognize that agencies such as the EPA have successfully grappled
with seemingly insurmountable, complex social and economic ills.
If such a move is effective, the expansion of the governmental bu-
reaucracy and budget would seem to be a reasonable trade-off given
the escalating costs corporations currently face from hackers. More-
over, such a solution avoids the complications associated with
congressional gridlock. The FCC’s action here will also allow Con-
gress to avoid political consequences associated with agency
rulemaking.
Next, critics may claim that governmental agencies are ill-
equipped to handle the magnitude of regulatory and legal enforce-
ment spurred by hacking incidents. They may claim that efficiency
205. An Executive Assistant Director of the FBI, Richard McFeely noted that the “biggest
issue right now is getting the private sector to a comfort level where they can report anoma-
lies, malware, incidences within their networks.  It has been very difficult with a lot of major
companies to get them to cooperate fully.” Michael D. Scott, 18 No. 2 Cyberspace Law 3, CYBER-
SPACE LAW. (March 2013).
206. Other commentators have noted the potential effectiveness of mandatory standards.
See Robert Gyenes, A Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework is Unworkable – Government Must Crack the
Whip, 14 U. PITTSBURGH J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 293, 310–13 (2014).
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would tend to mandate that corporations mitigate their own losses
and enforce their own rules. Such a criticism ignores the vast intelli-
gence and criminal enforcement mechanisms that the United
States has already mobilized in response to complicated issues such
as international terrorism. If agency cooperation, headed by the
CTIIC, can encourage cross-agency cooperation in that same way,
government can indeed serve as the best enforcement and regula-
tory mechanism for the corporate cybersecurity quandary.
Overall, like any solution, the CTIIC-supported issuance of regu-
lations by the FCC in this area may not be a perfect one. Given the
nature of the issue, however, it appears to be a far superior ap-
proach to the hacking back and active defense model solution
proposed by others.
CONCLUSION
Although the magnitude of the corporate cybersecurity problem
may seem daunting, resort to common law principles clarify possi-
ble solutions and strategies for mitigating the damage inflicted by
hackers. Likewise, defense of property principles clarify why some
active defense strategies will amplify the costs associated with hack-
ing, rather than alleviate corporate losses. Common law principles
show that the FCC, partnered with the CTIIC, should promulgate
regulations that clarify the bounds of corporate defensive strategies
and aid corporations in securing their digital borders.
